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The current regulations in the United States leave little, if any, 
recourse for an individual whose privacy has been invaded by another 
individual using a drone. The proposed drone rules from the Federal 
Aviation Administration do little to address privacy concerns beyond 
data security. Further, individual states are adopting wildly different 
policies that will create a scrambled mess of regulations for drone pilots 
and citizens alike to sort through. Therefore, a common system of 
privacy laws should be adopted regarding drone use. The United 
Kingdom’s Protection of Freedoms Act and Data Protection Act and a 
proposed law by an Australian advocacy group provide a model 
framework that the states themselves, or the federal government, should 
impose to ensure individual privacy rights are not trampled in this new 
age of drones. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“[A]t root privacy is a simple understanding: not everything belongs 
to everyone.”  
  
 1. J.D. Candidate, May 2017. Professor Nancy Costello, thank you for your 
guidance—you always make my writing better. Kyla Barranco, thank you for your love 
and support throughout the writing process.  
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ʊ Nick Harkaway, The Blind Giant2
 
William Meredith’s daughter was sunbathing on July 26, 2015 when 
she saw the drone flying above her backyard.3 Although the drone had 
briefly disappeared when Meredith’s daughter waved it off, William 
Meredith was concerned and grabbed his shotgun.4 “Within a minute or 
so, here it [the drone] came. It was hovering over top of my property, and 
I shot it out of the sky. I didn’t shoot across the road, I didn’t shoot 
across my neighbor’s fences, I shot directly into the air.”5 Instead of 
being praised for protecting his privacy rights and preventing someone 
from spying on his daughter, Meredith was charged with wanton 
endangerment and criminal mischief.6 “Our rights are being trampled 
daily,” declared Meredith. “Not on a local level only — but on a state 
  
 2. NICK HARKAWAY, THE BLIND GIANT: BEING HUMAN IN A DIGITAL WORLD 
122 (2012). This is the premise I will use throughout my article. Many noted scholars—
including Justice Douglas of the United States Supreme Court—would potentially 
disagree. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946). Justice Douglas, ruling 
against the owners of a chicken farm that was disrupted by air travel overheard, stated: “It 
is ancient doctrine that at common law ownership of the land extended to the periphery of 
the universe—Cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum. But that doctrine has no place in 
the modern world. The air is a public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not 
true, every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless trespass suits. 
Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize such private claims to the airspace would 
clog these highways, seriously interfere with their control and development in the public 
interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only the public has a just 
claim.” Id. at 260-261. It is my contention that common sense does not revolt at the idea 
of restrictions on aircraft above property. Rather, society is in desperate need of some 
common sense boundaries to stop drones from encroaching on our last remaining spheres 
of privacy. For a more in-depth discussion of the United States v. Causby case, see 
LAWRENCE LESSING, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW 
TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004).  
 3. Douglas Ernst, Ky. Man Arrested After Shooting Down $1,800 Drone 
Hovering Over Sunbathing Daughter, THE WASH. TIMES (July 30, 2015), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jul/30/william-merideth-arrested-after-
shooting-down-1800/.
 4. Id.  
 5. Id.  
 6. Id. 
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and federal level. We need to have some laws in place to handle these 
kind of things.”7 
The idea of personal privacy in the United States has been around for 
over a century.8 Defining privacy as “the right ‘to be let alone,’” Samuel 
Warren and Louis Brandeis in 1890 proposed an application of existing 
common laws to protect individuals from instantaneous photographs and 
the newspaper enterprise.9 Today, a new encroacher, unmanned aircraft 
systems (UAS), more commonly known as drones, calls for a similar 
application of current laws to meet changing privacy concerns in modern 
society.  
The American consumer’s appetite for drones is growing rapidly. 
Some early 2015 reports projected hobbyists in the United States to buy 
700,000 drones in 2015, which would represent a 63% increase from the 
previous year.10 Officials from the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) projected that over one million drones were sold in the 2015 
holiday season alone.11 According to Brian Wynne, the CEO for the 
Association of Unmanned Vehicle Systems International, the drone 
industry “is poised to be one of the fastest-growing in American history. . 
. . [D]uring the first decade following [drone] integration . . . , the 
industry will create more than 100,000 high-paying jobs and provide 
  
 7. Id.  
 8. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. 
L. REV. 193 (1890). 
 9. Id. at 195.  
 10. Craig Whitlock, Federal Regulators to Require Registration of Recreational 
Drones, THE WASH. POST (Oct. 19, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/federal-regulators-to-require-
registration-of-recreational-drones/2015/10/19/434961be-7664-11e5-a958-
d889faf561dc_story.html.  
 11. Christian de Looper, The FAA is Very Concerned about the One Million 
Drones To Be Sold This Holiday Season, TECH TIMES (Oct. 1, 2015, 4:19 PM), 
http://www.techtimes.com/articles/90598/20151001/faa-very-concerned-idea-million-
drone-sales-holiday-season.htm; Michael del Castillo, This Christmas 1 Million Expected 
Drone-Sales Will Need to Include Federal Papers, N.Y. BUS. J (Oct. 19, 2015, 2:29 PM), 
http://www.bizjournals.com/newyork/news/2015/10/19/this-christmas-1-million-
expected-drone-sales-will.html.   
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more than $82 billion in positive impact to the nation’s economy.”12 This 
rapid increase in demand for drones ensures that drones will not leave 
our consciousness, or way of life, anytime soon.  
Drones have a wide range of applications for commercial use, 
“include[ing]: newsgathering; crop and wildlife monitoring; inspections 
of power lines, pipelines, bridges, and antennas; aerial photography; and 
other research and educational activities.”13 The FAA recognizes even 
more potential uses, including aiding in rescue operations.14 
However, drone operations are not limited to commercial 
applications. Drones have already been used to spy on women, 
undressing in high-rise buildings,15 and sunbathing in their backyard.16 
Private actors are trying to develop solutions for agencies to effectively 
police drones, but these are not yet ready.17 In the meantime, consumers 
are taking privacy protections into their own hands. Items like the 
DroneDefender, described as “the first portable, accurate, rapid- to-use 
counter-weapon to stop suspicious or hostile drones in flight, providing 
critical security protection at home and abroad,” allows users to shoot 
  
 12. AUVSI Highlights Benefits of Unmanned Aircraft Systems, Need for Small 
UAS Rule, AUVSI (Nov. 23, 2015, 3:24 PM), http://www.auvsi.org/blogs/auvsi-
membership/2015/11/23/energyandcommerce.  
 13. Lois Mermelstein, FAA’s New Draft Drone Rules, 11 THESCITECHLAWYER 
14, 14 (2015).  
 14. Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80 Fed. 
Reg. 9543, 9545, 9548 (Feb. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 21, 43, 45, 47, 61, 
91, 101, 107, and 183)[hereinafter Operation of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems]. 
 15. James Queally, Seattle Woman Says Drone Seemed to be Spying on Her, L.A. 
TIMES (June 24, 2014, 5:31 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-
seattle-peeping-tom-20140624-story.html.  
 16. Alex Wellman, Dad Shoots Down Drone ‘Spying on His Sunbathing 
Daughter’ –and is Arrested by Cops, MIRROR (Aug. 1, 2015, 4:51 PM), 
http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/ 
world-news/dad-shoots-down-drone-spying-6177304. 
 17. Charles E. Ramirez, Mich Tech Prof Developing Drone to Catch Other 
Drones, DETROIT NEWS, (Feb. 15, 2016, 11:36 PM), 
http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/ 
michigan/2016/02/15/drone-killer/80435642/.  
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drones out of the sky in an effort to provide privacy protections for 
citizens.18  
The purpose of this note is to demonstrate gaps in the current system 
of privacy laws in the United States. Although privacy laws exist in each 
state, individual states have taken wildly disparate actions regarding 
drones.19 As a result, a patchwork system of laws leaves great confusion 
for drone rules around the country. The FAA has also proposed its own 
drone rules.20 However, those rules are concerned with administrative 
matters such as drone registration and collecting pilot information.21 The 
FAA even admits that privacy concerns are beyond the scope of its 
rulemaking.22  
To combat these inconsistent laws around the country, three things 
must happen quickly. First, the United States should adopt elements of 
the United Kingdom’s Data Protection Act, and policy recommendations 
from Australian advocacy group, Liberty Victoria, to provide a clear and 
consistent set of regulations that will protect individual citizens from new 
aerial intrusions. Second, the Federal Aviation Administration should 
enact more stringent registration requirements for all drone operators. To 
advance the second goal, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
must require drone registrants to tag all drones with long-range radio 
frequency identification devices or some other similar mechanism. Third, 
a smartphone app should be developed to provide all citizens with a 
quick and convenient means to identify drones via Radio Frequency 
  
 18. Zach Epstein, New Rifle Shoots Drones out of the Sky Without Firing a Single 
Bullet, YAHOO! (Oct. 16, 2015), https://www.yahoo.com/tech/s/rifle-shoots-drones-sky-
without-firing-single-bullet-132038513.html. 
 19. See infra Part III.  
 20. Operation of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, supra note 14, at 9544. 
 21. Drone operators must obtain the same airman certificate that pilots of regular 
aircraft obtain. Id. at 9550. Before drones became deregulated for commercial use, 
operators had to apply for exemptions to the airman certificate requirement under § 333 
of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012. Id. at 9552. However, the FAA was 
more concerned with safety than anything else when granting § 333 exemptions. Id. at 
9551. The key considerations for the FAA when granting § 333 exemptions are that “(1) 
the operation must not create a hazard to users of the national airspace system or the 
public; and (2) the operation must not pose a threat to national security.” Id.  When 
considering safety, visual line of sight operation is a primary concern. Id.  
 22. Id. at 9552. 
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Identification (RFID). Without a means of long-range identification, any 
law protecting the personal privacy of a citizen from a drone hovering 
400 feet in the air is toothless.23  
This note is limited to personal privacy concerns only. Criminal 
procedure privacy concerns surrounding the Fourth Amendment will not 
be discussed. Those concerns have been thoroughly addressed,24 and for 
the purpose of focus over breadth, will not be discussed here. Further, 
this note will treat all drones — with and without cameras — equally. 
Citizens whose rights are potentially infringed by a drone flying 
overhead should not have to determine whether that drone is carrying a 
camera. To require a citizen to determine whether a drone is carrying a 
camera before seeking redress for privacy violations is nonsensical when 
drones can fly hundreds of feet high. Finally, I recognize the inherent 
limitations of federalism to enact a binding rule upon all states.25 This 
note will not discuss the constitutional legitimacy of a federal drone 
privacy statute, but merely provide a recommendation that the federal 
government, or all states, should adapt.  
 With those limitations in mind, this note will propose a new normal for 
privacy in the United States. Section II will discuss the efforts made by 
the executive branch of the federal government to define a framework for 
privacy issues. Section III will examine state efforts to grant drone 
privacy rights. Finally, Section IV will identify relevant foreign ideas to 
craft a sweeping drone privacy law for the United States.  
  
 23. The Federal Aviation Administration has set 400 feet as the maximum height 
for drone flight. Sarah Gonzalez, Where Can Drones Fly? Legal Limits are Up in the Air, 
NPR (Aug. 10, 2014, 9:43 AM), http://www.npr.org/2014/08/10/339181964/where-can-
drones-fly-legal-limits-are-up-in-the-air. 
 24. See, e.g., Victoria T. San Pedro, Drone Legislation: Keeping an Eye on Law 
Enforcement’s Latest Surveillance Technology, 43 STETSON L. REV. 679 (2014); See also 
Y. Douglas Yang, Big Brother’s Grown Wings: The Domestic Proliferation of Drone 
Surveillance and the Law’s Response, 23 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 343 (2014). 
 25. See WELLS C. BENNETT, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, CIVILIAN DRONES, 
PRIVACY, AND THE FEDERAL-STATE BALANCE (2014). But there is a possibility that a 
federal law could “establish a statutory core to be shared by the states, or a statutory 
floor, permitting state deviation towards more protection.” Margot E. Kaminski, Drone 
Federalism: Civilian Drones and the Things They Carry, 4 CAL. L. REV. CIR. 57, 65.  
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II.  THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH HAS ESSENTIALLY PUNTED ON THE ISSUE 
OF PRIVACY CONCERNS REGARDING DRONES 
The delivery truck of the future is not a truck at all — it’s a drone.26 In 
December 2013, Amazon proposed to deliver packages to customers via 
autonomous drone delivery.27 The system, called Prime Air, promises to 
deliver packages to customers within thirty minutes of an online order.28 
Amazon will use drones weighing more than fifty-five pounds to deliver 
packages weighing less than five pounds to customers more than ten 
miles from distribution centers.29 And this system is not far off. 
According to Amazon, “[f]rom a technology point of view, we’ll be 
ready to enter commercial operations as soon as the necessary 
regulations are in place.”30 However, those regulations have proved to be 
a large hurdle, the biggest challenge to Amazon has been convincing the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) that drone delivery should be 
allowed.31 While Amazon brought the drone issue squarely into the 
  
 26. Lisa Eadicicco, Amazon Reveals New Details About Drone Deliveries, TIME 
(Jan. 19, 2016), http://time.com/4185117/amazon-prime-air-drone-delivery/.   
 27. David Streitfeld, Amazon Floats the Notion of Delivery Drones, N.Y TIMES: 
BITS (Dec. 1, 2013, 10:07 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/12/01/amazon-floats-
the-notion-of-delivery-drones/.   
 28. Amazon Prime Air, AMAZON http://www.amazon.com/b?node=8037720011 
(last visited Sept. 26, 2016). 
 29. David Pogue, Exclusive: Amazon Reveals Details About Its Crazy Drone 
Delivery Program, YAHOO! TECH (Jan. 18, 2016), 
https://www.yahoo.com/tech/exclusive-amazon-reveals-details-about-
1343951725436982.html.   
 30. Streitfeld, supra note 27.  
 31. Id. The FAA granted Amazon an Experimental Airworthiness Certificate on 
March 19, 2015. Kelsey D. Atherton, The FAA Approves Delivery Drones, As Long As 
Amazon Changes Everything, POPULAR SCIENCE (Mar. 20, 2015), 
http://www.popsci.com/faa-approves-delivery-drones-if-amazon-changes-everything. 
However, the FAA’s requirements for testing make Amazon’s idea of autonomous drone 
delivery impossible. Id. According to the FAA, “Under the provisions of the certificate, 
all flight operations must be conducted at 400 feet or below during daylight hours in 
visual meteorological conditions. The UAS must always remain within visual line-of-
sight of the pilot and observer. The pilot actually flying the aircraft must have at least a 
private pilot’s certificate and current medical certification.” Amazon Gets Experimental 
Airworthiness Certificate, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION (Mar. 19, 2015), 
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public consciousness, there was already movement behind the scenes to 
integrate drones into the U.S. airspace In 2012, Congress passed the 
FAA Modernization and Reform Act.32 Section 332 of the Modernization 
and Reform Act required the Secretary of Transportation and a number 
of other stakeholders to “develop a comprehensive plan to safely 
accelerate the integration of civil unmanned aircraft systems into the 
national airspace system.”33 The FAA’s proposed rules deferred privacy 
concerns to the executive branch.34 The White House issued a 
memorandum entitled “Promoting Economic Competitiveness While 
Safeguarding Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties in Domestic Use 
of Unmanned Aircraft Systems” on the same day the FAA published its 
proposed rules.35 Most of the memorandum focused on the steps agencies 
must take for privacy protections, accountability, and transparency.36 The 
memorandum also established a multi-stakeholder agreement process to 
“develop and communicate best practices for privacy, accountability, and 
transparency issues regarding commercial and private [drone] use in the 
[National Airspace System].”37 The multi-stakeholder process was to be 
initiated by the National Telecommunications and Information 
  
http://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=82225&cid=TW303. Based on these 
requirements, Amazon must always have a pilot and an observer for every drone. Id. This 
will make it impossible for Amazon to use autonomous drones unless the FAA changes 
its stance. Atherton, supra. 
 32. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, 126 Stat. 
11 [hereinafter FAA Modernization Act]. 
 33. Id. § 332. 
 34. Operation of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, supra note 14, at 9552. 
 35. Promoting Economic Competitiveness While Safeguarding Privacy, Civil 
Rights, and Civil Liberties in Domestic Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80 Fed. Reg. 
9355 (Feb. 15, 2015) [hereinafter Promoting Economic Competitiveness]. 
 36. Id. Privacy protections include examining the existing drone policies and 
procedures relating to information collected, retained, and used by UAS. Id. §(1)(a). 
Accountability protections include the implementation of policies and procedures to 
provide training and oversight to agencies wishing to use drones. Id. §(1)(c). Finally, 
transparency protections require agencies to provide notice to the public about where 
agencies may operate drones, and require agencies to provide summary reports of drone 
activities from the previous fiscal year. Id. at §(1)(d). 
 37. Id.  
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Administration (NTIA) within 90 days of the publication of the 
memorandum.38 
Consistent with the ideas set forth in the presidential memorandum 
and the FAA Modernization and Reform Act, the FAA and the 
Department of Transportation agreed to engage in a multi-stakeholder 
process “to assist in this process regarding privacy, accountability, and 
transparency issues concerning commercial and private [drone] use in the 
[National Airspace System].”39 The multi-stakeholder process led to the 
National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), 
and the Department of Commerce publishing a request for public 
comment on March 5, 2015.40 The goal of the process was to “generate a 
set of non-binding ‘best practices’ for [drone] operation.”41 The National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) decided 
that, given the early stages of the drone industry, non-binding best 
practices were preferable to a binding code of conduct.42 
In the request for public comment, the National Telecommunications 
and Information Administration (NTIA) published a series of preliminary 
questions concerning privacy.43 For the purpose of this note, those 
questions can be grouped into two general categories.  
1. What “best practices” will mitigate the privacy challenges posed by 
drones without stifling innovation?44 
2. How must a drone be marked to provide the public notice of who is 
operating the drone? Specifically,  
  
 38. Id.  
 39. Operation of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, supra note 14, at 9552. 
 40. Privacy, Transparency, and Accountability Regarding Commercial and 
Private Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80 Fed. Reg. 11,978 (Mar. 5, 2015) 
[hereinafter Private Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems]. 
 41. Liz Woolery, Our Drone Future: Kicking Off the NTIA Multistakeholder 
Process, NEW AM: OPEN TECH. INST. (Aug. 6, 2015), 
https://www.newamerica.org/oti/our-drone-future-kicking-off-the-ntia-multistakeholder-
process/. 
 42. Id.  
 43. See Private Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems, supra note 40, at 11,980. 
 44. Id.  
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x How can companies and individuals best provide notice to the 
public regarding where a particular entity or individual operates a 
[drone] in the [national airspace]?45 
x What mechanisms can facilitate identification of commercial and 
private UAS by the public?46 
x Would standardized physical markings aid in identifying 
[drones] when the aircraft are mobile or stationary?47 
x Can [drones] be equipped with electronic identifiers or other 
technology to facilitate identification of [drones] by the public?48 
A. The decision to use non-binding best practices has rendered the 
discussion of those best practices moot in practice. 
The public comments on the questions are available on the National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration’s website.49 In 
addition to the public comments, the National Telecommunications and 
Information Administration (NTIA) held six stakeholder meetings that 
were broadcast around the country.50 The most recent of these meetings 
was May 18, 2016.51 Prior to the November 20, 2015 meeting, several 
  
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Comments on Privacy, Transparency, and Accountability Regarding 
Commercial and Private Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems, NATIONAL 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS & INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION (Apr. 24, 2015), 
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/federal-register-notice/2015/comments-privacy-transparency-
and-accountability-regarding-commercial-a.  
 50. Multistakeholder Process: Unmanned Aircraft Systems, NATIONAL 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS & INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION (June 21, 2016), 
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/other-publication/2015/multistakeholder-process-unmanned-
aircraft-systems.  
 51. Id.  
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sets of these non-binding best practices have been published. From some 
of those best practices, the following privacy suggestions arose52:  
x [Drone] operators should establish a process, appropriate to the 
size and complexity of the operator, for receiving privacy, security, 
or safety concerns. Commercial operators should make this process 
easily accessible to the public, such as by placing points of contact 
on a company website. . . . 53  
x Commercial [drone] operators should identify individuals to 
oversee compliance with applicable laws and drone privacy and 
security policies. . . . 54  
x Commercial [drone] operators should make a reasonable effort to 
periodically review compliance with applicable laws and privacy 
and security policies.55 
Consistent with the rest of the National Telecommunications and 
Information Administration (NTIA) discussion, these best practices are 
also non-binding.56 Unfortunately, because the “best practices” are non-
binding, they have not even been identified. 
  
 52. UAS Privacy Best Practices – Discussion Draft v 2, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY 
& TECHNOLOGY (Nov. 19, 2015), 
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/cdt_uas_best_ 
practices_draft_v2_111615_clean.pdf.  
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Congress attempted to make a drone privacy statute, but the bill died in 
House committee. Keith Laing, Lawmakers File Bill to Limit US Drones, Citing Privacy 
Concerns, THE HILL (Feb. 14, 2013, 6:14 PM), 
http://thehill.com/policy/transportation/283195-lawmakers-file-bill-to-limit-domestic-
drone-flights. The Preserving American Privacy Act of 2013, H.R. 637, was never 
enacted. Preserving American Privacy Act, H.R. 637, 113th Cong. (2013). The 
Preserving American Privacy Act would have applied to drones: “It shall be unlawful to 
intentionally operate a private unmanned aircraft system to capture, in a manner that is 
highly offensive to a reasonable person, any type of visual image, sound recording, or 
other physical impression of a individual engaging in a personal or familial activity under 
circumstances in which the individual had a reasonable expectation of privacy, through 
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B. Visual markings are not enough. Drones must be marked with 
something more identifiable.   
According to the FAA’s Frequently Asked Questions about drone 
registration, every drone registrant will be provided with a unique FAA 
registration number that must be marked on the drone.57 The number 
must be affixed in a medium such as, “permanent marker, label, or 
engraving, as long as the number remains affixed to the aircraft during 
routine handling and all operating conditions and is readily accessible 
and legible upon close visual inspection.”58 In addition, “[t]he number 
may also be enclosed in a compartment that is readily accessible, such as 
a battery compartment.”59 
Return to the story of William Meredith and his sunbathing daughter. 
Meredith was charged with wanton endangerment and criminal mischief 
for shooting down a drone.60 The drone Meredith shot down was worth 
$1,800 and belonged to David Boggs.61 Boggs alleges that the drone was 
almost 200 feet in the air, but Meredith claims it was hovering only ten 
feet above his home.62 Consider Meredith’s options here under the two 
essential questions posed. First, what “best practices” should Boggs, as 
the operator, abide by according to the National Telecommunications and 
Information Administration’s recommendations? And second, how 
should the drone be marked so that it is easily identified?  
Under the Obama administration’s circular logic in the “multi-
stakeholder process,” Boggs, as a drone operator, is supposed to partake 
  
the use of a visual or auditory enhancing device, regardless of whether there is a physical 
trespass, if this image, sound recording, or other physical impression could not have been 
achieved without a trespass unless the visual or auditory enhancing device was used.” Id.  
 57. UAS Registration Q&A, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., 
http://www.faa.gov/uas/registration/faqs/?cid=TW386 (last modified Sept. 19, 2016). 
 58. Id.  
 59. Id.  
 60. Ernst, supra note 3.  
 61. Id.; Travis Ragsdale, Interview: Drone Owner Responds to Claims of Privacy 
Invasion, WDRB (July 30, 2015, 9:28 PM), 
http://www.wdrb.com/story/29675427/drone-owner-responds-to-claims-of-privacy-
invasion. 
 62. Ragsdale, supra note 61.  
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in developing the “process” for receiving immediate privacy concerns.63 
Even if the drone was 200 feet above Meredith’s property, as Boggs 
alleges,64 was Boggs really considering Meredith’s privacy? Instead of 
spying, Boggs states he was merely “having fun with [his] friends and 
family.”65 But does it matter? To Meredith, the drone was spying on his 
teenage daughter sunbathing in his own backyard.  
Moreover, how was Meredith supposed to identify the drone? The 
FAA’s guidelines suggest that the drone registration markings should be 
visible “upon close visible inspection,” or may even be marked inside a 
battery compartment!66 If the drone were two hundred feet in the air, as 
Boggs suggests67, Meredith would have needed binoculars to even have a 
chance to see the markings. But if the markings were in the battery 
compartment, there is no way Meredith could see the markings, even if 
the drone was flying 10 feet high, as Meredith alleged.68  
Meredith, having no realistic way to identify the drone, shot it down.69 
Boggs called the police, and Meredith was charged with wanton 
endangerment and criminal mischief.70 A county court judge, Rebecca 
Ward, dismissed the charges against Meredith, finding that he was 
merely defending his right to privacy.71 
But this begs the question — what, if any, binding precedent do these 
“best practices” have upon Boggs when he flew his drone over 
Meredith’s property? The answer appears to be none. The FAA avoided 
  
 63. UAS Privacy Best Practices, supra note 52. Because these “best practices” 
have not been identified, it’s unclear what Boggs should have done. Theoretically he 
could have notified everyone in his flight path about his travel plans; he could have flown 
more quickly over Meredith’s house and not hovered; or he could have simply flown 
somewhere else.  
 64. Ragsdale, supra note 61.  
 65. Id.  
 66. UAS Registration Q&A, supra note 57. 
 67. Ragsdale, supra note 61.  
 68. Id. 
 69. Ernst, supra note 3. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Justin Peters, Judge Dismisses Case Against Man Who Shot Down a Drone 
Over His Property, SLATE: FUTURE TENSE (Oct. 28, 2015, 5:17 PM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2015/10/28/case_against_william_merideth_for
_shooting_down_a_drone_is_dismissed.html. 
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any responsibility by shoving privacy concerns onto the President.72 The 
President created this “multi-stakeholder process” that expressly stated it 
did not want to create a binding code of conduct for the young drone 
industry.73 And now the ‘process’ that the National Telecommunications 
and Information Administration (NTIA) recommendations created 
merely encourages operators themselves to develop a process for 
receiving privacy concerns!  
To summarize, the FAA sought publication of a rule for the 
commercial use of drones. By seeking publication of a rule, the FAA 
wanted to create clarity and stability around the increased use of 
commercial drones. But the FAA did not want to let its rule touch 
privacy laws, so the President acted. The President did not want to 
propagate a rule from the top down, so he passed it off to stakeholders. 
Now those stakeholders are simply suggesting letting the operators, like 
David Boggs, create the processes for themselves! The passing of the 
torch has come full circle, and what does the drone industry have to show 
for it? A set of non-binding practices that individual drone operators may 
or may not know about, and can choose to follow if they wish.  
William Meredith believes he had no other option than to shoot down 
the drone. “Police told me there was nothing they could do about it. 
Nobody would do anything about it, so I did something about it.”74 When 
citizens are resorting to firearms to solve their privacy concerns, clearly 
something more needs to be done. 
III.  THE STATES HAVE ATTEMPTED TO ENACT DRONE PRIVACY 
LEGISLATION, BUT THEIR EFFORTS ARE MERELY A PATCHWORK 
SOLUTION TO A BROADER PROBLEM. 
The states deserve credit because they are at least attempting to enact 
legislation regulating drones for privacy concerns. “45 states considered 
168 [drone] bills” in 2015 alone, and twenty states passed twenty-six 
  
 72. Operation of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, supra note 14, at 9552. 
 73. Woolery, supra note 41.  
 74. Peters, supra note 71.  
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total bills.75 In 2016, forty-one states have passed twenty-six total bills.76 
For example, Arkansas amended its voyeurism laws to include drones.77 
California amended its paparazzi laws to encompass drones by 
preventing paparazzi from trespassing on “the airspace above the land,”78 
and Mississippi added drones to the list of instruments covered under its 
peeping tom statute.79 Kansas amended its definition of harassment to 
include “any course of conduct carried out through the use of an 
unmanned aerial system over or near any dwelling, occupied vehicle or 
other place where one may reasonably expect to be safe from uninvited 
intrusion or surveillance.”80 However, the remaining state drone 
legislation deals primarily with surveillance, criminal procedure, or 
hunting activities.81 
Curiously, popular rapper Kanye West is a voice of reason in the 
drone privacy debate. In an interview with Rolling Stone magazine, West 
expressed concern over the paparazzi’s use of drones to spy on his wife 
and daughter.82 “Are there drones flying where she’s trying to learn how 
to swim at age 1? Wouldn’t you like to just teach your daughter how to 
swim without a drone flying? What happens if a drone falls right next to 
her? Would it electrocute her?”83 West ultimately decided to sell his Los 
Angeles home because he could be photographed from the street by the 
paparazzi.84 
  
 75. Current Unmanned Aircraft State Law Landscape, NATIONAL CONFERENCE 
OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/current-unmanned-
aircraft-state-law-landscape.aspx (last updated Sept. 9, 2016). 
 76. Id. This number is only a reflection of the total legislation up to August 1, 
2016. It appears that states are increasing their efforts to enact more drone legislation as 
drones become more prevalent.  
 77. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-16-102 (West 2015). 
 78. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8 (West 2016).  
 79. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-61 (West 2015). 
 80. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-31a02(b) (West 2016). 
 81. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 75. 
 82. Kory Grow, Kanye West Fears Paparazzi Drones, Asked About Nazis in 
Deposition, ROLLING STONE (Aug. 7, 2014), http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news 
/kanye-west-fears-paparazzi-drones-asked-about-nazis-in-deposition-20140807.  
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
208 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 25.1 
 
The California legislature responded to the paparazzi complaints 
when it passed Assembly Bill No. 856.85 Governor Jerry Brown signed 
the bill into law on October 6, 2015.86 Assembly Bill No. 856 amended 
§1708.8 of the California Civil Code to “expand liability for physical 
invasion of privacy to additionally include a person knowingly entering 
into the airspace above the land of another person without permission.”87 
Now §1708.8 reads,  
A person is liable for physical invasion of privacy when the person 
knowingly enters onto the land or into the airspace above the land of 
another person without permission or otherwise commits a trespass in 
order to capture any type of visual image, sound recording, or other 
physical impression of the plaintiff engaging in a private, personal, or 
familial activity and the invasion occurs in a manner that is offensive to 
a reasonable person.88 
In essence, the amendment merely applies to the airspace above a 
person’s home or property where drones are most likely to capture 
images. While this is a positive start, one can imagine a set of scenarios 
in which this patchwork set of state drone legislation is insufficient to 
meet new issues of privacy among the states. Two hypotheticals will be 
discussed to illustrate this point. First, what is the recourse for the Seattle 
woman whose privacy was invaded by a drone when she was changing in 
her high-rise apartment?89 Second, what would happen if I was standing 
in one state but flying my drone in another? Which state’s laws would 
apply?  
  
 85. Justin Peters, Good News for Kanye West: California Bans Paparazzi Use of 
Drones to Spy on Celeb Homes, SLATE: FUTURE TENSE (OCT. 9, 2015, 2:50 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2015/10/09/california_bans_paparazzi_use_of_
drones_to_spy_on_celebrities_at_home.html.  
 86. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8 (West 2016) amended by Assemb. B. 856 (Cal. 
2015). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. (emphasis added). 
 89. James Queally, Seattle Woman Says Drone Seemed to Be Spying on Her, LA 
TIMES (June 24, 2014, 5:31 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-
seattle-peeping-tom-20140624-story.html. 
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In late June 2014, Lisa Pleiss was undressed in her Seattle apartment 
building when she noticed a drone flying outside.90 “It was freaky . . . 
[y]ou don’t expect to be walking around indecent in your apartment and 
have this thing out there potentially recording you.”91 Pleiss contacted 
her building concierge, who notified the police.92 Pleiss was able to take 
a picture of the drone before it moved out of sight.93 A Seattle police 
detective was at a loss on how to enforce the issue.94 “It’s fairly common 
that technology has outpaced legislation and lawbreaking. At this point, 
there are no, that we have found yet, laws, at least for Seattle, as to how 
an unmanned [aerial vehicle] is to be operated in this city.”95 
Assume for a moment that California Civil Code §1708.8 applied 
here. For drones, §1708.8 specifically applies to “the airspace above the 
land of another person.”96 The law is great for celebrities like Kanye 
West who have sprawling estates with ample airspace. But for Lisa 
Pleiss, in a high-rise building, the drone was not actually above her 
airspace, but merely outside it. And because the Seattle police could not 
find a specific drone regulation or ordinance applying to the situation, 
they could only speculate that a law might have been broken.97 
Other states have adopted remedies that could possibly apply here as 
well.98   
x Arkansas prohibits the use of UAS to commit voyeurism.99 HB 
1770 prohibits the use of UAS to collect information about, or 
  
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. James Queally, Seattle Woman Says Drone Wasn’t Spying on Her after All, 
LA TIMES (June 25, 2014, 12:58 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-
nn-seattle-drone-update-20140625-story.html.  
 93. Id.  
 94. Queally, supra note 89. 
 95. Id. 
 96. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8 (West 2016).  
 97. Queally, supra note 89.  
 98. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 75. 
 99. H.B. 1349, 90th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2015); See also 2015 Ark. 
Acts 293. 
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photographically or electronically record, information about critical 
infrastructure without consent.100 
x Florida’s search and seizure laws prohibit the use of a drone to 
capture an image of privately owned property or the owner, tenant, 
or occupant of such property without consent if a reasonable 
expectation of privacy exists.101 
x Mississippi’s voyeurism laws specify that using a drone to 
commit “peeping tom” activities is a felony.102 
x North Dakota HB 1328 provides limitations for the use of UAS 
for surveillance.103 
But these laws are the exception, not the general rule overall for the 
states.104 Some local governments or universities are even taking things 
into their own hands.105 However, some states are preventing local 
governments from enacting their own drone laws.106 Notably, Lisa 
Pleiss’s home state of Washington had made no law concerning drones 
and privacy, or voyeurism so she had no recourse against those who may 
  
 100. H.B. 1770, 90th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2015). See also 2015 Ark. 
Acts 1019. 
 101. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.50 (West 2015). 
 102. MISS. CODE. ANN. § 97-29-61 (West 2016). 
 103. H.B. 1328, 64th Gen. Assemb., Reg Sess. (N.D. 2015).  
 104. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 75. 
 105. U-M announces temporary ban on drones, DETROIT FREE PRESS, (Feb. 13, 
2016, 8:53 AM), 
http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2016/02/13/university-michigan-
temporary-ban-drones/80335450/.  
 106. Maryland SB 370 specifies that only the state can enact laws to prohibit, 
restrict, or regulate the testing or operation of unmanned aircraft systems. NATIONAL 
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 75. This preempts county and 
municipal authority. Id. See also Jenna Portnoy & Josh Hicks, New Laws in Va., Md. and 
D.C. Regulate Drones, Uber, Social Media, THE WASH. POST (June 30, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/new-laws-in-va-md-and-dc-
police-drones-uber-and-social-media/2015/06/30/d14f6cc0-1e93-11e5-bf41-
c23f5d3face1_story.html. The bill also requires a study on specified benefits. Id.   
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have invaded her privacy.107 According to Pleiss, “[i]nitially my response 
was ‘that’s kind of cool,’ and then I very quickly registered there were 
cameras on it, and then I very quickly realized I was not fit to be on a 
camera at that point, and that’s when the panic set in.”108 Luckily, the 
drone operator flying outside of Pleiss’s building was merely 
surveying.109 Pleiss was able to speak with the operator after he had 
given his name and phone number to Seattle Police and he reassured her 
that he did not have any pictures of her.110 The operator intentionally shot 
at an angle where sunlight would obscure views into the building.111 
Empirical evidence strongly suggests that not all drone operators are 
as noble as the one flying outside of Lisa Pleiss’s apartment.112 The 
system is broken when anyone, sitting in the comfort of his or her own 
home, backyard, or changing room is not safe from invasions of 
privacy.113 State laws have not evolved quickly enough to adapt to the 
changing realities and possibilities of drones. 
  
 107. Since that time, Washington has proposed House Bill 1093, which would 
prohibit voyeurism by drone and require all drones to be labeled with the owner’s name 
and contact information. Which Bills Are Still Alive at Legislature’s Halfway Point, 
SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 25, 2016, 3:11 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-
news/politics/what-bills-are-still-alive-at-legislatures-halfway-point/.  
 108. Queally, supra note 92. 
 109. Id.  
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. A simple YouTube search reveals numerous instances of drones flying to spy 
on women on beaches and rooftops. E.g., ViralHog, Drone helicopter spies topless 
woman, YOUTUBE (Oct. 20, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5HOtqFxqmRA;
irekim, Rc DrOnE fLiEs OvEr NuDe BeAcH, and gets chased out, YOUTUBE (Sept. 3, 
2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PiSEIUnPlEE; THISISZION42303, Crazed 
Woman Attacks 17-year old for Flying Drone on Beach, YOUTUBE (June 18 2014), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=azFsvay4oLE; Pedro Corpion, Girl flashes drone on 
boat, YOUTUBE (Nov. 7, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LxMpeU1pk7Y;
Gonad, AR Drone 2.0 spying, YOUTUBE (Mar. 18, 2013), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uzjDdVQNFN0; Lane Pearson, Drone – neighbor 
spy, YOUTUBE (Dec. 7, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PqSmaOTiWxM.  
 113. Even 126 years later, this statement from Warren & Brandeis’ influential law 
review article holds true: “numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the 
prediction that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-
tops.’” Warren & Brandeis, supra note 8, at 195.  
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Another potential issue could arise when drones fly across state lines. 
Interstate travel or commerce would usually fall under the realm of the 
federal government,114 but as I have stated, drone privacy matters have 
fallen to the states.115 And when the state drone laws are so varied and 
disparate,116 confusion will arise. The question becomes — if I am 
standing in state A and fly my drone into state B’s airspace, which state’s 
laws apply to me? 
The United States government has claimed jurisdiction over all 
airspace in the United States.117 But that appears to be just for air travel, 
not air privacy. Legal commentator Renee M. Landers has argued that 
federal jurisdiction is justified in these situations. “When offenders seek 
to exploit the jurisdictional limitations of particular states, where an 
important federal right requires protection, and where state substantive 
law is otherwise inadequate to achieve full vindication of the rights 
involved, federal action is justified.”118 Other commentators suggest that 
the federal government should not have any drone jurisdiction, and that 
drone privacy laws should be left to individual states.119  
Overall, many problems exist with the state-by-state privacy model. 
States are slow to adopt new laws, the new laws are inconsistent with one 
another, and may even be nonexistent in certain areas.120  And even if the 
  
 114. See 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a)(1) (2012). 
 115. See supra Section II.  
 116. See generally NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 
75. 
 117. 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a)(1) (2012).  
 118. Renée M. Landers, Legislating Federal Crime and its Consequences: 
Prosecutorial Limits on Overlapping Federal and State Jurisdiction, 543 THE ANNALS OF 
THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. AND SOC. SCI. 64, 70 (1996). 
 119. Margot E. Kaminski, Drone Federalism: Civilian Drones and the Things 
They Carry, 4 CAL. L. REV. CIR. 57 (2013). 
 120. There is ample evidence from other areas of the law that states have a hard 
time coming to a consensus regarding laws and regulatory schemes. See, e.g., Susan L. 
Pollet, Still a Patchwork Quilt: A Nationwide Survey of State Laws Regarding Stepparent 
Rights and Obligations, 48 FAM. CT. REV. 528 (2010) (family laws); Ashley Arthur, 
Combating Obesity: Our Country’s Need for a National Standard to Replace the 
Growing Patchwork of Local Menu Labeling Laws, 7 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 305, 306 
(2010) (health labeling laws). In certain instances, the federal government can prod the 
states with a funding carrot to ensure that all states fall in line. See, e.g., South Dakota v. 
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state drone privacy laws are enacted, the variation from state-to-state 
creates a patchwork environment where individual citizens are bound to 
get hurt.121  
IV.  A MODEL AMERICAN DRONE PRIVACY LAW SHOULD BE BUILT 
FROM THE FRAMEWORK OF DRONE PRIVACY LAWS FROM THE 
UNITED KINGDOM AND AUSTRALIA.  
The current federal-state dichotomy of drone laws in the United States 
leaves much to be desired. Other countries are also wading into drone 
regulation, and ideas from those countries can help the United States 
answer the two fundamental questions necessary to make drone laws 
effective: what are the “best practices” for drone operators to use to 
mitigate privacy concerns without stifling innovation, and how should 
drones be identified to make those best practices effective?  
The law I propose should be viewed as a sweeping statutory law 
instead of a privacy tort. I propose a statute instead of a tort for two 
reasons. First, privacy torts have slowly but surely been whittled away by 
  
Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (permitting the federal government to condition the 
receipt of highway funding on raising the minimum drinking age). Some issues even 
require actions by the Supreme Court because states are acting too slow or inconsistently. 
E.g., E. Todd Bennett & James D. Milko, The Dilemma of Patchwork Solutions: Same-
Sex Issues, 38 MD. B.J. 18 (2005) (providing a history of patchwork state law responses 
to the Supreme Court’s decision in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)); Obergefell v. 
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (legalizing gay marriage across the country).  
 121. An analogy may be drawn between the slow implementation of drone privacy 
laws and the federal government’s slow regulation of ridesharing service Uber. Aaron 
Sankin, The Dizzying State of America’s Drone Laws, DAILY DOT (Apr. 24, 2014, 3:28 
PM), http://www.dailydot.com/politics/us-state-drone-laws-mess/. There are dozens of 
examples of violent incidents that have occurred because unregulated Uber drivers have 
access to passengers and seek to take advantage of them. See ‘Ridesharing’ Incidents, 
WHO’S DRIVING YOU?, http://www.whosdrivingyou.org/rideshare-incidents (last visited 
Mar. 16, 2016) (listing dozens of ‘ridesharing’ incidents). Close to home at Michigan 
State University, two students reported that a ride share driver made unwanted sexual 
advances on them, causing the entire campus to be put on alert. Aaron Baskverville, 
Michigan State University Students Warned About Ride Sharing Services in Wake of 
Assaults, WXYZ DETROIT (Feb. 26, 2016 11:03 PM), 
http://www.wxyz.com/news/michigan-state-university-students-warned-about-ride-
sharing-services-in-wake-of-assaults.  
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courts.122 I do not wish for this law to be so limited over time, especially 
considering that the drone industry is still in its infancy stages.123 Second, 
there are already privacy statutes at all levels of government.124 Although 
those laws each have their own weaknesses, their mere existence 
demonstrates the opportunity for this sweeping drone privacy law to be 
enacted.125 
A. It does not matter whether the federal government or the states 
make the law, as long as it is uniform in application and 
enforcement.  
The FAA clearly wants to maintain control of most drone regulations. 
It has attempted to foreclose the issue in an opinion issued in late 2015.126 
Citing safety concerns, the FAA opinion sought to retain the final say on 
  
 122. “Dean William Prosser separated privacy cases into four [separate] but 
related torts—intrusion, appropriation, private facts, and false light.” ADAM D. MOORE, 
PRIVACY RIGHTS: MORAL AND LEGAL FOUNDATIONS 101 (The Pa. State Univ. Press ed., 
2010); see also JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN 
AMERICA 45 (Random House, Inc., 2000). Those four torts were incorporated into the 
second Restatement of Torts. MOORE, supra. However, as Moore mentions, there has 
been a significant movement away from Prosser’s four privacy torts as courts have 
systematically ruled against them and undermined their efficacy. Id. at 116-22.  
 123. Commentators are calling for the federal government to act quickly and 
develop a standardized law. E.g., Alan McQuinn, Don’t Let States Make a Mess of Drone 
Laws, REPUBLIC 3.0 (Feb. 2015), http://republic3-0.com/dont-let-states-make-mess-
drone-laws/. While safety risks are a concern as federal agencies delay publication of 
clear drone privacy rules, the bigger blow could result when states “inadvertently hamper 
innovation in an attempt to protect their citizens’ safety and privacy.” Id.  
 124. MOORE, supra note 122, at 101.  
 125. Id. at 111. Moore highlights several federal privacy laws, including the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Act, the Privacy Act of 1974, the Computer 
Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988, the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act, and the Video Voyeurism Prevention Act of 2004. Id. Moore also 
notes that although the Video Voyeurism Prevention Act contains some very strong 
privacy protections, its scope is too narrow because it only protects privacy in public. Id.  
 126. Office of the Chief Counsel, State and Local Regulation of Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems (UAS) Fact Sheet, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION (Dec. 17, 2015), 
https://www.faa.gov/uas/regulations_policies/media/UAS_Fact_Sheet_Final.pdf.  
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all regulations of the registration and operation of UAS.127 However, the 
FAA stated that laws traditionally falling within local and state police 
power, including voyeurism, should remain in local and state power.128 
Thus, there is room for each state to enact its own drone privacy law, 
enact the same drone privacy law as all other states, or do nothing.  
Foreign countries have recognized the most important “best practice” 
is to unify privacy laws across member states to achieve uniformity and 
consistency in the application of those laws. That begins by identifying 
privacy as a fundamental right.129 For example, the European Parliament 
emphasizes that the laws of any nation should not lessen an individual’s 
fundamental right to privacy; rather, national laws should emphasize the 
right to privacy.130 In an effort to achieve that goal, the European 
Parliament has unified laws regarding the processing of personal data 
and the free movement of such data across country lines.131 In addition, 
the Australian advocacy group Liberty Victoria has called for a 
harmonization of laws between the Australian federal, state, and 
  
 127. Id. at 2. The FAA wants to avoid “fractionalized control of the navigable 
airspace” and the “patchwork quilt” of state and local regulations that would prevent the 
FAA from effectively regulating air traffic. Id. Essentially, the FAA is claiming field 
preemption based on Arizona v. U.S., 132 S.Ct. 2492, 2502 (2012).  
 128. Id. at 3. Other examples of local and state police power include the warrant 
requirement for police to use UAS surveillance, prohibitions on UAS hunting, and 
prohibitions on attaching weapons to UAS. Id.  
 129. See, e.g., Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the 
Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 
[hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon]. 
 130. Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal 
Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 32. 
 131. See id §8. (“Whereas, in order to remove the obstacles to flows of personal 
data, the level of protection of the rights and freedoms of individuals with regard to the 
processing of such data must be equivalent in all Member States; whereas this objective 
is vital to the internal market but cannot be achieved by the Member States alone, 
especially in view of the scale of the divergences which currently exist between the 
relevant laws in the Member States and the need to coordinate the laws of the Member 
States so as to ensure that the cross-border flow of personal data is regulated in a 
consistent manner that is in keeping with the objective of the internal market as provided 
for in Article 7a of the Treaty; whereas Community action to approximate those laws is 
therefore needed”).  
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territorial governments.132 Therefore, I propose that the true “best 
practice” for drone operators is a single clear and uniform law that will 
help with consistency and application across the United States.133   
B. A unified drone privacy law should set up dual zones of privacy 
and make drone owners liable for either negligent or reckless 
behavior. 
Liberty Victoria, an advocacy group from Australia, has proposed a 
civil remedy for privacy violations with surveillance equipment.134 
Specifically, a person is subject to a civil penalty when, without consent, 
surveillance of private activity occurs and involves: 
Ɣ “a mental requirement of intent or recklessness;  
Ɣ an understanding that each person holds a reasonable expectation 
of privacy with respect to certain activities and locations but not 
others; and 
Ɣ appropriate exceptions drawn from current surveillance devices 
laws to protect beneficial surveillance.”135 
Similarly, the United Kingdom’s Data Protection Act of 1998 
punishes those who obtain personal data unlawfully.136 Under this Act, 
personal data must not be “knowingly or recklessly” obtained or 
disclosed.137 In principle, these laws hold merit for a model drone privacy 
law in the United States. Both the United Kingdom’s Data Protection Act 
  
 132. REECE CLOTHIER ET AL., LIBERTY VICTORIA, THE USE OF DRONES IN 
AUSTRALIA: AN AGENDA FOR REFORM 6 (2015). 
 133. As I stated above, I am not advocating for the states or the federal 
government in particular to pass this law. I believe it would be easiest for the federal 
government to pass it, but states may have more opportunity given the recent gridlock in 
Washington. Regardless of how it happens, the law should be implemented across the 
board. 
 134. CLOTHIER ET AL., supra note 132, at 7.  
 135. Id.  
 136. Data Protection Act, 1998, c. 29, § 55 (U.K.).  
 137. Id.  
2017] Dual-Zone Model of Personal Privacy 217
 
and the proposed Australian law recognize each person’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy and allow for surveillance exceptions.138 
Additionally, presence of a mental state requirement in both laws could 
serve to prevent accidents and needless litigation.139   
While the Australian and British laws provide a solid framework, they 
apply broadly to all surveillance. As such, they need to be more narrowly 
tailored to drone usage to be truly effective. The mental state 
requirements of intent or recklessness in each law are too protective of 
drone operators. Liberty Victoria in Australia argues that intent or 
recklessness will “avoid capturing unintended or innocent 
surveillance.”140 The group uses an example of someone inadvertently 
capturing photos of a breastfeeding mother in a maternity ward to make 
its point,141 but this example does not necessarily apply to drones. First, 
drone operators are not going to be flying in a maternity ward. Second, 
preventing drone operators from seeing breastfeeding mothers, or naked 
individuals generally in the privacy of their own home, is the goal 
here.142 When an individual’s privacy has been violated, they should have 
an adequate remedy. The individual should not have to prove what the 
operator’s intent was when he or she was flying over the home. Instead, 
the “best practice” should be that operators have a duty of care to not fly 
over private land. Because operators should have a duty of care, 
negligence in some form should be the requisite mental state. 
  
 138. The Data Protection Act does have loopholes for this knowing or reckless 
standard. Id. The statute does not apply when: (a) the information necessary to prevent or 
detect crime; (b) the person had a reasonable belief that he had a right to collect the 
information; (c) the person had a reasonable belief that he would have consent; or (d) 
obtaining or disclosing the information was in the public interest. Id. § 55(2)(a)-(d). The 
proposed Australian law allows for exceptions to protect one’s own commercial and 
economic interests, or to monitor for domestic violence. CLOTHIER ET AL., supra note 
132, at 15. 
 139. CLOTHIER ET AL., supra note 132, at 7; Data Protection Act, supra note 136.  
 140. CLOTHIER ET AL., supra note 132, at 14. 
 141. Id. 
 142. This law should be confined to areas wherein a person has a “reasonable
expectation of privacy.” Id. at 15. According to Liberty Victoria, a reasonable expectation 
of privacy occurs in “‘personal spaces.’” Id. “Personal spaces” are where “each person 
should feel free to express him or herself: in the home, while talking to close friends, 
while meeting another in a technically public yet secluded space.” Id. 
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Modeling the new standardized law after the Australian and British 
statutes, but substituting negligence, the law would read: [a] person is 
subject to civil penalty when, without consent, surveillance of private 
activity occurs and involves: 
x “a mental requirement of [negligence];  
x an understanding that each person holds a reasonable expectation 
of privacy with respect to certain activities and locations but not 
others; and 
x appropriate exceptions drawn from current surveillance devices 
laws to protect beneficial surveillance.”143 
To balance the countervailing interests of drone operators in this new 
market and citizens seeking to maintain their property rights, a dual zone 
system should be created. This dual zone system will provide a sphere of 
protection around citizens by lowering the mental state requirement for 
invasions of privacy closer to the citizens, and will expand drone 
capabilities in regions farther from citizens by using a higher mental state 
requirement. Currently, the FAA will allow drones to fly up to 400 feet 
high.144 Thus, there is a region of 400 feet from the ground to the FAA 
ceiling for drones in which drone operators can fly.145  
There is also a natural presumption that the closer a drone is to a 
person, the more invasive that drone becomes.146 The opposite is also 
true, as a drone gets farther away, it becomes less intrusive. As such, 
citizens need more privacy protections when drones are closer, and less 
  
 143. See Data Protection Act, 1998, c. 29, § 55 (U.K.); see also CLOTHIER ET AL., 
supra note 132.   
 144. Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 42063 (Aug. 29, 2016).
 145. Id. I like to think of this as the FAA ceiling for drones, with the ground as the 
floor. 
 146. This concern is especially heightened when one considers the mobility and 
“inhuman persistence” that drones may use to invade privacy. OFFICE OF THE PRIVACY 
COMMISSIONER OF CANADA, DRONES IN CANADA: WILL THE PROLIFERATION OF DOMESTIC 
DRONE USE IN CANADA RAISE NEW CONCERNS FOR PRIVACY? 14 (2013) [hereinafter 
DRONES IN CANADA].  
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when drones are farther away.147 Therefore, I propose splitting a citizen’s 
spheres of privacy into two zones, each having a different mental state 
requirement for an invasion of privacy claim.148 The zone closest to the 
ground will have only a mental state requirement of negligence. This 
should serve to provide the greatest protection (outside of strict liability) 
to citizens on the ground while still allowing drone operators to behave 
responsibly. Higher in the air, the mental state requirement will only be 
recklessness. Citizens have less of a privacy interest when the drones are 
higher in the air, and this higher mental state requirement for culpability 
should sufficiently allow drone operators to use their drones more 
pervasively.149 This also complies with the FAA’s mandate not to chill 
the market for drones by preemptively putting too many regulations on 
them to start.150  
Enforcement concerns also play a factor in the dual zone model. 
Later, I propose the use of active radio frequency identification (RFID) 
as a means to identify drones in encroaching airspace.151 Current active 
RFID technology only allows identification at a maximum range of 100 
  
 147. There are certain technological limitations with drones, including, “drone 
operational reliability, image-quality, precision of drone control and of camera control, 
reliability of image-capture and -transmission, misidentification of surveillance targets, 
and robustness.” Roger Clarke, The Regulation of Civilian Drones’ Impacts on 
Behavioural Privacy, 30 COMPUTER L. & SEC. REV. 286, 291 (2014). Currently, there are 
drones with 4K camera capabilities and flight ranges over a mile long. The Best 
Commercial Drones, BUY THE BEST DRONE (Jan. 15, 2016), 
https://buythebestdrone.com/best-commercial-drones/. The DJI Inspire 1 drone, for 
example, can shoot live video in 720p quality. Id. As cameras become more and more 
advanced, the idea is that as drones get closer, our privacy shrinks. It is conceivable to 
think that someday all drone cameras will see clearly from 400 feet. When (and if) that 
reality arrives, this may be a moot point.  
 148. There is an open question as to whether the difference is even relevant. Some 
researchers wonder whether jurors even notice the difference between recklessness and 
negligence when punishing actions. See Matthew R. Ginther et. al., The Language of 
Mens Rea, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1327, 1329 (2014).  
 149. See, e.g., Colin Cahoon, Low Altitude Airspace: A Property Rights No-Man’s 
Land, 56 J. AIR L. & COM. 157, 159 (1990) (wondering who actually owns the airspace 
above our homes).   
 150. Woolery, supra note 41.   
 151. See discussion infra Section IV(c). 
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meters, or approximately 300 feet.152 Splitting the privacy spheres into 
two zones allows citizens the opportunity to evaluate whether a drone 
really is invasive and works within existing technology frameworks. 
Citizens could identify drones in the lower zones simply by using an app 
on their smartphone. However, the higher zones would require 
binoculars or some other long-range method. This also serves to protect 
the privacy rights of drone operators acting reasonably in upper airspace 
while shielding citizens from nearby drones.  
Presumptively, if a citizen can pick up a RFID signal on their phone, 
the drone will be within 200 feet, and negligence will apply. But if the 
citizen cannot pick up a RFID signal, the drone is outside of 200 feet, 
and the recklessness standard will apply. I do note that there is a potential 
for interference that could skew these ranges,153 but that should hopefully 
be mitigated when RFID is applied in open airspace.  
 
The figure below highlights the mental state of each zone154:  
  
 152. Active vs. Passive RFID: When Do I Need to Use Active RFID? Or Will 
Passive RFID Work Just as Well?, JOVIX, http://atlasrfid.com/jovix-education/auto-id-
basics/active-rfid-vs-passive-rfid/ [hereinafter Active vs. Passive RFID] (last visited Jan. 
18, 2016). 
 153. See generally Dr. Y. Kim and J.G. Yook, Interference Analysis of UHF RFID 
Systems, 4 PROGRESS IN ELECTROMAGNETICS RES. B. 115 (2008).  
 154. Below 200 feet, a negligence standard will apply. Citizens on the ground can 
identify drones using their smartphones and the corresponding RFID chips imbedded in 
the drones. From 200–400 feet, a recklessness standard will apply. Although current 
RFID technology has limited utility in this range, a citizens can still use binoculars to 
identify registration markings on the exterior of every drone. No drones are allowed to fly 
above 400 feet. Diagram courtesy Karinna Sanchez, Michigan State University.   
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Some could argue that this law is potentially too broad. There is no 
such thing as absolute privacy; rather, privacy should be viewed on a 
continuum.155 Indeed, it also appears that as today’s younger generations 
age, they feel less of a need for privacy protections because their lives 
are already so digitized.156 Coupled with society’s changing social mores, 
this makes information that was likely to be kept private a few decades 
  
 155. Kevin D. Haggerty, What’s Wrong with Privacy Protections? Provocations 
from a Fifth Columnist, in A WORLD WITHOUT PRIVACY: WHAT LAW CAN AND SHOULD 
DO? 190, 194 (Austin Sarat, ed., 2015). 
 156. See MOORE, supra note 122, at 4 (“Many digital natives, those who have 
grown up with digital technology, have been advocating ‘free access’ views that would 
undermine legal protections for privacy.”). 
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ago more palatable today.157 Another view suggests that the constant 
presence of drones in the sky could create a “chilling effect” in public 
spaces and erode privacy.158 These changing social mores cut against 
such a sweeping privacy statute applying to drones, especially 
considering the proliferation of drones that is about to occur. 
But privacy has not fallen off the continuum; rather, it should be 
valued in our society today more than ever. As one commentator notes, 
“[p]rivacy . . . is a core human value – the right to control access to 
oneself is an essential part of human well-being or flourishing.”159 And if 
privacy is truly a social norm, it should be codified into law.160 The law 
has adapted to technological advances such as the printing press and 
radio broadcasting in the past, so there is no reason that it cannot adapt 
now.161 Even more so, the immense rise of drones could serve as a 
privacy catalyst by restoring our idea of a privacy violation.162 
  
 157. JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN 
AMERICA 49 (2000). 
 158. DRONES IN CANADA, supra note 146, at 14 (“[S]ociety’s expectations of 
privacy in public could seriously erode if drone use for surveillance activities . . . could 
become normalized over time as an accepted interference in our lives.”). 
 159. MOORE, supra note 122, at 6. 
 160. Id. at 99. “If legal systems are to reflect important moral norms, then privacy 
protections must be codified in the law.” Id.  
 161. Id. at 131. Moore further notes, “In recent times, digital technology and 
information networking have profoundly changed our notions of public and private. 
Individual privacy is everywhere threatened. But this need not be so. There have been 
many technological advances in the past that forced changes in legal systems – the 
printing press and radio broadcasting are obvious examples. Within the current expansion 
of digital technology, we need to think more imaginatively about legal protections for 
privacy.” Id. at 131-32. 
 162. DRONES IN CANADA, supra note 146, at 14 (“The physical presence and 
visibility of drones - to the extent that they are visible - could actually mean that people 
would feel observed regardless of how or whether the information was actually used.”). 
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C. All drones should be required to register for an active radio 
frequency identification tag that will support rapid 
identification systems.   
While it is necessary to develop the unified law applying to all drone 
operators in the United States, the law is effectively useless if aggrieved 
citizens cannot identify airborne drones. Currently, drone operators must 
affix the registration number in a medium such as “permanent marker, 
label, or engraving, as long as the number remains affixed to the aircraft 
during routine handling and all operating conditions and is readily 
accessible and legible upon close visual inspection.”163 But given the 
long-range capabilities of the cameras on new drones, this registration 
policy appears to disproportionately benefit the drone operators by 
preventing citizens from identifying drones unless the drones land. Even 
further, the registration number may be affixed inside the battery 
compartment.164 That is equivalent to placing your license plate inside 
the trunk of your car to avoid detection by the police.165  
Some commentators have suggested a mixed system of signals, 
including warning markings, lights, and a drone identification number to 
be logged in a state registry.166 But for the reasons stated above, I do not 
believe that this would be enough. Realistically, citizens on the ground 
are not going to use binoculars to search out the drone’s identification 
number when the drone is hundreds of feet in the air. Markings and 
warning lights would also require a degree of training and the 
dissemination of information to all citizens about their meaning. These 
solutions all require average citizens to take steps beyond what they 
already do in their ordinary lives to be free from drone intrusion. An 
effective drone privacy policy should not make it more difficult for 
citizens to realize their right to privacy.  
Thankfully, a sensible solution potentially exists. Radio frequency 
identification (RFID) is a generic term for technologies that use radio 
  
 163. UAS Registration Q&A, supra note 57 (emphasis added).  
 164. Id.  
 165. Thanks for the analogy, Charlie Andrews.  
 166. A. Michael Froomkin & P. Zak Colangelo, Self-Defense Against Robots and 
Drones, 48 CONN. L. REV. 1, 67 (2015). 
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waves to automatically identify people or objects.167 A RFID system 
consists of a tag, which is made up of a microchip with an antenna and 
an integrator with an antenna.168 RFID systems are already used 
frequently around the country. Toll roads use structures like E-Z Pass 
system to quickly allow vehicles to pass through toll plazas without 
stopping.169 Retailers like Wal-Mart use RFID to monitor customer 
behavior, while Japanese retailers have used RFID to increase sales 
efficiency.170 Perhaps most ubiquitously, credit cards and passports also 
come with RFID capabilities.171 
Radio frequency identification comes in two forms: passive and 
active. Passive tags require power from the RFID reader to power the 
tag, while active tags use a battery to continuously power the tag and 
emit a signal.172 Passive tags only have a short range of approximately 
three meters, whereas active tags could potentially read up to one 
hundred meters.173 Because of their enhanced range and ability to emit 
their own signal, active tags may cost anywhere between $15 and $100, 
while passive tags may cost merely $0.15 to $5.00.174 Passive RFID tags 
will not be effective when drones are hundreds of feet in the air. Based 
on this information, I propose that all new drones for civilian use should 
require an active RFID tag.  
The FAA has already considered using RFID registration for 
drones.175 Any RFID use would have to be approved by either the 
Federal Communications Commission or the NTIA.176 But it is not a 
  
 167. Frequently Asked Questions, RFID JOURNAL, http://www.rfidjournal.com/ 
site/faqs#Anchor-What-363 (last visited Feb. 16, 2016). 
 168. Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) Frequently Asked Questions, AIM, 
http://www.aimglobal.org/?page=rfid_faq (last visited Feb. 20, 2016). 
 169. Jennifer E. Smith, You Can Run, but You Can’t Hide: Protecting Privacy 
from Radio Frequency Identification Technology, 8 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 249, 257 (2007). 
 170. Id. at 257-58. 
 171. Id. at 259-60. 
 172. Active vs. Passive RFID, supra note 152.  
 173. Id.  
 174. Id.  
 175. Nabiha Syed & Michael Berry, Journo-Drones: A Flight Over the Legal 
Landscape, 30 COMM. LAW. 1, 23 (2014). 
 176. “Within the United States, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
manages and authorizes all non-federal use of the radio frequency spectrum, including 
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stretch to imagine the government requiring RFID registration. The 
government already requires registration for cars, boats, guns, etc. Drone 
registration would merely be another form of accountability for citizens. 
There is also a question of the specific type of information to be 
provided by the drone registration RFID tag. Namely, when a concerned 
citizen points their smartphone at a drone, what will he or she see? Two 
options appear relevant. In one scenario, citizens may see the drone 
operator’s entire name, drone number, address, or any other information 
as provided by the drone operator when he or she registers the drone with 
the FAA. In another scenario, only the drone registration number is 
present. There are certainly privacy concerns for drone operators, and 
publication of their information for the entire world to see could dissuade 
some users from complying with mandated drone registration.177 Further, 
would a citizen need to know the name of the operator of every drone 
flying above, or would it only be relevant when the citizen was 
concerned and wanted to take legal action? In the interest of privacy for 
the drone operators, I propose that only the drone registration number be 
made visible via active RFID tags.178 When a citizen on the ground 
points their phone at a drone, that citizen should only be able to see the 
drone’s registration number.179 As noted previously, some commentators 
have proposed a state registry of drone numbers, similar to the ones 
  
state and local government as well as public safety.” Integration of Civil Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems (UAS) in the National Airspace System (NAS) Roadmap, FEDERAL 
AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 29 (Nov. 7, 2013), 
https://www.faa.gov/uas/media/uas_roadmap_2013.pdf [hereinafter UAS Roadmap]. 
“The National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) manages 
and authorizes all federal use of the radio frequency spectrum.” Id. “UAS spectrum 
operations within the United States need either the approval of the FCC or NTIA and 
shall not transmit without being properly authorized.” Id. 
 177. See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 
1461, 1463 (2000) (“[P]rotecting the acquisition and dissemination of information is an 
essential means of empowering citizens in a democracy.”). Froomkin argues that 
“informational privacy” is “the ability to control the acquisition or release of information 
about oneself.” Id. Further, the most effective way to control information privacy is not to 
share the information in the first place. Id.  
 178. Each drone is already marked with a registration number, so this will be no 
different than the current policy. UAS Registration Q&A, supra note 57.   
 179. Id. 
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already in use for automobiles.180 If the citizen wanted to take legal 
action, a state registry of drone identification numbers (or the FAA 
registration numbers) can be used to find the identity of the drone 
operator.181  
D. Citizens should have a smartphone app that allows them to use 
radio frequency identification to identify drones flying 
overhead and notify law enforcement with the push of a button.  
In conjunction with a RFID identification tag requirement for all 
drone registration, the government should concurrently develop a free 
app for all citizens to download.182 This hypothetical app would allow 
citizens to point their cell phone at a flying drone and receive the drone’s 
registration number in return. Using that same app, citizens could 
transmit the drone registration number and geo-tagged location to police 
for immediate reporting.183 By giving citizens the chance to identify 
drones flying over their property, it will make the sweeping drone 
privacy law proposed above enforceable. Without a phone app (or 
another means of reliably identifying drones), any proposed drone law 
will be toothless.  
  
 180. Froomkin & Colangelo, supra note 166, at 67. 
 181. Froomkin argues that people have significantly less control when their 
information is collected into a database. Froomkin, supra note 177, at 1464. But even he 
acknowledges the need for some collection by the government, including situations like 
applying for a driver’s license or getting a job. Id.  
 182. At this point, any drone identification app is purely hypothetical. But 64% of 
Americans currently own a smartphone, and an app seems like the most convenient way 
to get identification technology in the hands of all Americans. U.S. Smartphone Use in 
2015, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Apr. 1 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/01/us-
smartphone-use-in-2015/.   
 183. The ability to text the police in case of an emergency already exists. See, e.g., 
What You Need to Know About Text-to-911, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, 
https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/what-you-need-know-about-text-911 (last 
updated Aug. 15, 2016). Further, geo-tagging a location seems like it could be easily 
achieved. Apps, such as Find My iPhone, already exist that allow the user to see the 
location of their phone on a map. Find My iPhone, iPad, and Mac, APPLE, 
http://www.apple.com/icloud/find-my-iphone.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2016).  
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E. The potential drawbacks to using radio frequency identification 
do not preclude its use. 
Two significant obstacles appear with this new licensing system using 
RFID technology. First, will all drones be within range of the RFID 
technology? And second, what is the cost of implementing active RFID 
in all drones, and who will bear the burden of that cost? Each concern is 
addressed below. 
1. Active radio frequency identification does not work up to 
four hundred feet, but this limitation is used to make the 
dual zone model feasible.  
Current active RFID technology has a range of approximately 100 
meters, or 300 feet.184 The FAA ceiling on drone flight is 400 feet,185 so 
clearly active RFID cannot work for the entire flyable drone airspace. 
However, I believe that issue is solved neatly by bifurcating the zones of 
privacy. From ground level to 200 feet, active RFID may be used. From 
200-400 feet, active RFID will not be used.186 This makes decisions 
about which mental state level to enforce very easy, because the citizen 
will merely be asked how he or she identified the drone.187 Instead of 
avoiding RFID technology, as some commentators would,188 the 
limitations in the technology should be embraced to create this dual zone 
system.  
  
 184. Active vs. Passive RFID, supra note 152. 
 185. Gonzalez, supra note 23.  
 186. I recognize that active RFID may be used up to 300 feet, but this is testing the 
upper bounds of the technology. It will be better to operate within a functional limit that 
is sure to work rather than to stretch the technology as far as possible when initially 
implementing it.  
 187. There is an issue of those citizens that do not use the smartphone app, but 
want to identify a drone flying under 200 feet. Eyewitness testimony could still apply 
here.  
 188. See Froomkin & Colangelo, supra note 166, at 64. 
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2. The costs of active radio frequency identification 
registration and an identification app will be minimized 
by economies of scale and should be implemented 
immediately.
The cost of developing a drone identification app is variable. Small 
apps may generally be developed for less than $10,000, while larger, 
more complex apps may require up to $150,000 in development costs.189 
There are estimates that long-range RFID readers can cost upwards of 
$500.190 Outfitting every drone with a unique RFID tag would also bear a 
cost. And those RFID tags must be able to transmit their signal at long-
range. Those costs would surely add up. But the demand for drones 
appears to be growing rapidly, and now is the time to introduce these 
extra costs on drone registration.  
While a true estimate of the cost is impossible to provide without 
access to the technology and app developers, a funding mechanism is 
abundantly clear. Drone users currently pay $5 to register their drones.191 
This drone registration fee could be increased up to $20 or $25 — 
especially when some drones sell for more than $1,000 — to pay for the 
app. While the switch to RFID surely would increase this cost, it seems 
unlikely that it would reach the upper-bound $100 mark if the 
government were to require all drones in the registry to use active 
RFID.192  
When the drones are registered with active RFID, the drones will emit 
their own identification signal that may be picked up by an RFID reader 
  
 189. How Much Does It Cost to Develop a Mobile App?, ASTEGIC (July 10, 2013), 
https://www.astegic.com/cost-to-develop-a-mobile-app.  
 190. See RFID JOURNAL, supra note 167.  
 191. FAA Announces Small UAS Registration Rule, FEDERAL AVIATION 
ADMINISTRATION (Dec. 14, 2015), 
http://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/news_story.cfm? 
newsId=19856.  
 192. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Information, 
116 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 278 (2016) (noting that states providing a single registry 
service almost always benefit from economies of scale that lower the cost of centralized 
registries run by a single provider). 
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held by a citizen on the ground.193 Which is more effective: citizens using 
binoculars (which may not be on hand at the time) to identify minute 
markings on a drone hundreds of feet in the air, or citizens reaching into 
their pocket, pulling out their smartphone, aiming it at an encroaching 
drone, and identifying it with a push of a button? Radio frequency 
identification would serve as a substantial benefit to drone identification. 
There is a less imposed cost to society if the drone operator bears the 
burden of advertising the drone’s presence or capabilities.194 And when 
drones are failing to advertise their presence or capabilities, this will 
create a reasonable presumption that the drone is dangerous to a person’s 
privacy.195 
F. The Dual Zone System Would Have Helped William Meredith 
Recall the story of William Meredith and his sunbathing daughter. 
Meredith alleges David Boggs’s drone was only ten feet above the 
ground, while Boggs says the drone was two hundred feet in the air. 
Under the proposed system, there would be differing results based on the 
two scenarios. First, if Meredith was correct that the drone was only ten 
feet in the air, he would have been able to use an app on his smartphone 
to quickly get the registration number for the drone. After that, he would 
be required to contact the state registry or the FAA to get Boggs’s 
information. Meredith could then use that information to file a lawsuit 
where he would be required to show only that Boggs was negligent. 
Namely, that Boggs did not use reasonable care when flying low over 
someone’s backyard on a summer day because his camera could pick up 
a minor sunbathing.  
In Boggs’s scenario, the drone was almost two hundred feet in the air. 
For the sake of argument, assume that the drone was 210 feet up. In that 
  
 193. Active RFID transmits a signal regardless of whether a reader is present in 
the area, which will make all drones with active RFID tags identifiable at all times. Active 
vs. Passive RFID, supra note 152. 
 194. Froomkin & Colangelo, supra note 166, at 60. Froomkin and Colangelo also 
propose the use of a standardized ex ante warning light system wherein the burden of 
identifying harmlessness falls upon the drone operator before safe passage for the drone 
is guaranteed. Id. at 62.  
 195. Id. at 60.  
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case, Meredith would not have been able to identify Boggs’s drone using 
the RFID app on his phone, but would instead have to use binoculars or 
wait until the drone came lower into his airspace. But because Boggs 
would have been flying higher, he would only be subject to a 
recklessness standard and would be more likely to be operating 
reasonably.  
Clearly this system provides an incentive for drone operators to fly 
higher in the air. The FAA asked drone operators to identify best 
practices, and this appears to be a best practice — fly higher so that 
drone cameras do not unwittingly pick up private images that they should 
not otherwise be seeing. Drone operators can still fly low, as long as they 
are not negligent. Hypothetically, this would still allow drone operators 
to fly quickly over land as long as they were not hovering.  
While there are many possible scenarios that could play out, RFID 
and the dual zone system should accomplish a few goals. First, the dual 
zone system creates incentives for drone operators to operate more 
freely, at higher airspace, while protecting privacy lower to the ground. 
Second, RFID allows drones to be identified when the FAA’s guidelines 
would not otherwise require it. Third, the development of a drone 
identification app makes the dual zone system workable. Without the app 
(or some other means of rapid identification), any drone privacy law is 
worthless. Most importantly, now is the time to act on drone 
identification. Whether the system is RFID, as I propose, or some 
combination of lights and transponders, the important point is that the 
system is implemented before a substantial portion of the civilian base 
uses drones without the identification scheme.196  
  
 196. Id. at 63 (noting “the perfect time to establish a national standard . . .  is now, 
before there is a substantial installed civilian base without standard warning equipment. 
The more that private owners deploy aerial drones . . . without standard lights, the greater 
the cost of retrofitting the lights later—or the larger the class of unlighted and 
grandfathered-in robots, potentially undermining the effectiveness of any warning 
system.”). 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
The current federal guidelines from the Federal Aviation 
Administration provide a gaping chasm in privacy law enforcement. 
States have taken some steps to remedy the problem, but inconsistent, 
slow-to-develop state laws are not effectively solving the problem. The 
solution is for all states, or the federal government, to pass a sweeping 
drone privacy law. This drone privacy law, modeled on Australian and 
British principles and laws, will create two zones of privacy. Close to the 
ground, drone operators will be liable for negligently conducting 
surveillance, without an individual’s consent, of activities to which an 
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy. Higher in the air, 
recklessness will replace negligence, and drone operators will have more 
freedom. In conjunction with this sweeping drone law, the FAA should 
concurrently and immediately mandate all registered drones be tagged 
with a long-range radio frequency identification mechanism. This step is 
necessary to allow individuals with a reasonable expectation of privacy 
to identify drones flying overhead. Without the identification step, the 
law is a paper tiger, and the citizens of the United States will experience 
a greatly diminished sphere of privacy.  
 
